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Honday, August 14, 1967 A.E . 
REPUBLICANS URGE hAJOR Rl'~Foru~ OF P~TLAl~TIC ALLIANCE EK 
=---,;:;;;,;;;;~-- ---
T!.lt'. House Republican Committee on ~·Jestern Alliances today di}) 
~cc~mended a series of far-reaching steps designed to revitalize IS 
NATO, update Europe's role in Alliance affairs, and regain for the ~Jf~iO 
Alliance "an essential relevance .irLdealing with the needs and intere~t~ 
of its membership". 
The Committee, composed of 15 House Republicans and chaired by 
Rep. Paul Findley (Ill) 11 warned that without a comprehensive reworki~g 
of Alliance responsibilities and relationsh~ps, the NATO crisis will 
·1ccolerate "with the governments all but blind to the alan11ing evidence 
of decay that no amount of official post.uring can hide". 
As a first step 0 the Coramittee recommended that both the u.s. and 
ita allies apply a searching re-assessment of NATOo determining wh~thcr. 
the Treaty should be altered and \'lhether NATO policy is answering com:-.1v~:. 
:.weds of the Alliance --- security and othe~.rJise. "We are convinced tb~·.-::- · 
ex is···:· '.g and still developing obstacles to allied unity cannot be overco:ae 
o::lithout the exercise of political will, from all member governments at 
the highest levels", the Committee emphasized. 
This inter-allied revi€W should lead t- a NATO summit conference tu 
approve and formally announce agreed-to changes before the end of 1969 
when, the Conwitte~ ~0~~0: ~A~O r~~tj€~ ~re free to withdraw from the 
Treaty. 
The Committee made the following specific recommendations: 
1) Establish a NATO "strategy council" to give Europeans a 
genuine role in dcteunining NATO defense policy and 
nuclear deterence. Thus far, the U.S. has 11 appropriated 
all direction" in strategy decisions. The proposed council 
should "rear a European awareness and sophistication 
sufficient to earn the right to participate in the 
evolution of deterent doctrine for the Atlantic area", 
the Committee assertedo claiming that the existing 
J;llcNamara Committee is only intended "to make the 
Europcanc converoant in nuclear affairs". 
f.'10RE ••• 1-iORE .. D • 
House Republican Committee on t·Testern Alliances 
·- page 2 - Release 
2) Revitalize the NATO Council as the 11principal instrument 
for allied political decisioning 0 to resolve Alliance 
problems 11 determine strategy as recommended by the 
proposed 11 strategy council 11 11 consult on crises 
within and outside the NATO sphere. 
3) Broaden NATO Council's responsibility by authorizing it to 
seek inter-allied agreement on questions of East-l'Jest 
relations and trade~ disarmament, German reunification 
and central European security, aid to the underdeveloped 
countries 0 and other common issues. 
4) Revise NATO targets 11 quotaso and force levels "'1hich are 
currently outmoded or ignored. 
5) Attempt to harmonize national defense policies ana defense 
budgets of the NATO partners. 
6) Consider more equitable distribution of NATO command 
positions, including the appointment of a European 
commander as SACEUR. 
7) Grant official status to the North Atlantic Assembly 
(formerly known as NATO Parliamentarians Conference). 
8) Establish NATO machinery for the collection and review~ on 
a continuing basis, of worldwide intelligence material. 
9) Clarify u.s. nuclear cefense policy toward Europe. 
The overriding objective, the Committee stressed, is "to make an 
honest endeavor to utilize Alliance organs fully, and to make NATO a 
relevant instrument for inter-allied accomodation and decision ... 
"The problems which confront NATO ••• are political in nature. \\7e 
believe that European initiative and will must again be activated •••• 
This will help~ at the earliest stage 11 to correct the psychology and 
reality of imbalanceo brought about by American pm'ler and predominance"~ 
the Republican group stateo. 
Rep. Findley said the statement was prepared by a · ~eam · consis-
ting of Rep. Seymour Halpern (tfY) as chairman 11 and Rep. !-larvin Esch (I>1ich) 
Other members of the Committee are: Reps. E. Ross Adair (Ind)~ 
l'1illiam 0. Cowger (Ky) 11 trJilliam C. Cramer (Fla) 11 Sherman P. Lloyd (Utah), 
William s. l·iailliard (Calif), Rogers C.B. 1-'iorton (Md), Alexaneer Pirnie 
(NY) o Albert H. Quie (Minn) 11 ~7illiam V. Roth (Del) 0 Herman Schneebeli 
(Pa) o Charles \'7. ~~1halen (Ohio), and Larry \'7inn., Jr. (Kans). 
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The withdrawal of France from the command structure constitutes the most dramatic 
and unnerving spectacle of the long NATO crisis. To deflate the blow and reassert estab-
lished policy, working organs of NATO have been transferred from French soil and, at the 
instigation of Washington, the so-called McNamara Committee was launched to give some 
Europeans a closed-door education in American nuclear strategy. 
In two previous statements, we explored the nature of the NATO dilemma and 
attempted to identify major influences tending to weaken the Alliance.* Excluding for 
the moment the neglect and crude methodology on the part of the Kennedy-Johnson Adminis-
tration, most of these influences cannot be shunted aside as mere transitory, minor in-
dulgences on the part of the Western allies and outside powers. NATO is at a critical 
crossroads, reflecting the state of inter-allied diplomacy and world-wide politi~al 
change. 
For this reason, the concept of the Atlantic Alliance, its validity and objecti~e~, 
should be undergoing the most profound re-examination. Unfortunately, this is no~ the 
case. Thus far the "Atlantic Debate" is exclusively centered in the Congress and amo,ng 
troubled private observers. There is no indication that the present administration, 
recognizing the seriousness of the NATO problem and allied relations generally, is pre-
pared to apply the searching assessment which must precede a revitalization of Atlantic 
institutions. The paucity of official thought and action in this crucial area does not 
&\Ser well for the future of the Alliance. Judging from the record·, what discussion has 
evolved within the Executive Branch is largely piecemeal, unevenly responsive to annqying 
manifestations of NATO discord, subservient to entrenched attitudes and protective of all 
the familiar NATO cliches. 
We propose, therefore, as a first and essential step, that the government under-
take a thorough appraisal of the NATO situation, with a view toward developing a more 
realistic and meaningful policy toward NATO and Western Europe. At the same time, the 
European states should be encouraged to come forward, collectively, with proposals for 
improving allied diplomacy and for recastinf NATO in a manner that meets their interests 
and concerns. 
*Statements, dated June 13, 1967, and July 5, 1967, House Republican Committee 
on Western Alliances. 
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Wo arc connr~c.::-:.i ~h~t cxbtL:..g •:~•~.:1 :;t:!.:U uev-clopiag ob£:;tacles to allied unity 
ot th~ highest J.•:vel:J. 'i'~u problc;;::r. ~:i~ich c.oa.tror,t NATO, c;..:; an ins·::itution for allied 
coo1)eraticn, are political i.t nutu:cc. ]:JA'£0 te pr:i.::~;,::i.ly a r.::!.litary <:1lliance, but the credi-
bi.lity of collective nclf-d~fense dcp€.:!d~ nlway::; upc!i. U.:.; political interests of the member 
b.y~d to ch:.;.ni;ii.ig c-.. :d.l.tio~1::;, u:Ltld.n s:1~ Oi!t:::~ch~ G:Z tho H:'.!O -;:-cgion. The American disregard 
.I 
.... ~ 
N~vcrth31~:1c, c:J indic:r.::0.rl ia th~ Cc,·.1~'.c:i! rca\."\lution, th0. ccope of the inquiry 
t.:.; p-::cj:Jd:!..~~ t:!: :f.nj•;rc :t~o potc:-.tL'l .,.-.··.:~c, the re-evaluation 
I::: lHTJ, .:l<.: r::.i:i.it~r:U;- org:r:li.:r.~..::d, rcelbti(;u~.ly aru:.l~.:>r-iug present 
ar·.d fu:::ure ::.~·~ .. :u!.";:_ty r~-~ .. !\!d8? 
:t\;;,:;.J;,:~.l.;;nt::a'Lly, iE- f.::1~: O:cf,ar~l::.;~t:fo-..-: . .:lr;d. :Lt!: ll:··.:u:ary ·,::ol:Z.cy a hindrance 
ir a:.:I'!:'~,-~~·J:~~g sc~::rity :!.::, CJ:I~tJ"~'l .i:;•:t·r.,-?;·"' G8:r;u.a.:l :.:.·:~~.lT!.fic:lticn, and other 
pclitic~l objn~ti~c~? 
ShJ~.tld th~ t::c'lty, ~;·: .:_;,y .~l: :~ts d:t;_c~l<:~;, b;.; rc:v:lccd .:1· red:raft0d in 
U.ght ci dcv<·:l:)p.::::..-lt·; whi-:11 h.:.·.;~ t·.1.1:.•7: p:t~J.:•~ oL~v:e :!.t[j inception? 
In w~;.:lt ::'.1>.1!:~:: .~~'.:;: •. ~d ~L~ h:n!>.!J: ::\.~~:1 ~-~rF·-~nslhility ~,n· nuclear 
dC;terr::lC2. b~ b-:irrJ.'? 
Should t!.~wo i::c c·~:~.~;:··i)'"'d to h~~:.~G:;'li.:::t. ~:;l;c:~· r.1ajo:.: m.:~-::as 0£ policy 
bc:Jid~s the r.::Uit:Ja:-y, r.t~ch <:'.~ ;·,~.-:.t-t·.:-.t !';::::i.c:.tiono, aiJ to the under-
developed natic!1.r.:, a~td ihi:c·mctic·:·:::t:!. :::·:o:1cta1·y questJ.onG·? 
And !i;,-;:,::;t s:f.g·.1ificr1!tly: ho':;r (!;) lL<! othc:.:r r.:~t.;b-:.!rs vie:aali:;-.e NATO 
nnd i~1 ~;:lut 'vC.':/ (:·, ti:.C"y fed. i.\: c~~.:! •J'." d~-:-.•.1'Ld be: :!trcngtheacd? 
!\'~1 :::~:rc:.;;:: that by 196~', p.1rt:i.~3 NJ ·.dtht.!r:'~{~ frn:n the N.~o:th Atlantic Treaty 
• 1 
.,-.. ,\ 
4 ~: .~ 1_ ··""'· ·oh tt is at prc3ent inconceivable that any tr.o:.;a.ber state--even 
vide$ a conve-.:d.cnt liJ.tcrval to i11itiate immediately a plc.m.•cd a:.d covrdinated interallied 
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The success of the Marshall Plan was due~ in part, to the fact that from the 
beginning, the re-building program depended upon European initiative and will, jointly 
effectuated. We believe that European initiative and will must again be activated in 
order to strengthen and modernize institutions of allied cooperation, such as NATO. This 
will help, at the earliest stage, to correct the psychology and reality of imbalance, 
brought about by American power and predominance. 
On previous occasions, we have emphasized this imbalance as being one of the 
most damaging causes of the NATO decline. It discourages the European governments from 
making solid contributions to allied defense, in their own behalf; it is an anachronism, 
despite American power, in that the European states have regained their self-respect 
and viability; it has promoted among Europeans a curious ambivalence toward NATO: 
on the one hand, a resentment of American hegemony, and on the other hand, an unhealthy 
resignation to playing a ritualistic or minor role, due to the accepted power realities. 
~~nifestly, the study we propose must come to grips with this disequilibrium 
and, insofar as possible, suggest means of overcoming it and developing a truly European 
__ role-in Alliance politics. To rectify this situation, and meet other dilemmas of the 
NATO crisis, we wish to set forth additional recommendations of a more concrete nature, 
which hopefully will contribute to the present Atlantic discussion and spur the Adminis-
tration and the Congress to the necessary action • 
. ~ - .. 
In order to bridge the technological gap and bring about genuine European 
participation in matters of strategy and nuclear defense, we propose the establishment 
of a permanent, working NATO body where these issues can be debated and jointly resolved 
on a continuing basis. 
The object is not merely to make the Europeans conversant in nuclear affairs 
and keep them abreast of changing Anerican doctrine, although this is a prerequisite, and 
Jlpesenety~TenMfi\pa§ses the work of the McNamara CormittP.Q. · Aner!cans complain that Europe 
is -t~nor.:1~!: of th•'"" -~ .... -~ ~, wh.Lcn must therefore be handled exclusively by the United 
States, which owns both the nuclear punch and all the expertise. 
This is why the Alliance serves only to orchestrate American planning and 
strategic concepts, reinforcing the sharp imbalance of responsibility. 
Thus, we must create the facilities for co-determination within the Alliance. 
What must emerge is a European capability to contribute to nuclear defense of the NATO 
area, a process whereby concepts for European defense and Atlantic security flow from 
Europe as well as from Washington. It is tioe to openly encourage our allies to 
-formulat~_in reply--to their own conceived interests, a workable format for continuing 
close, Atlantic military cooperation. 
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The proposed strategy council must have the benefit of expert staff, and 
European members must have access to American nuclear planning information. This does 
not require that the United States relinquish control over strategic armaments, and 
their employment. Rather, it means rearing a European awareness and sophistication suf-
ficient to earn the right to participate in the evolution of deterrent doctrine for the 
Atlantic area, and hence the capacity to judge and propose as an intellectual peer. 
For instance, the European states should weigh the suitability of a coopera-
tively-owned nuclear capability on the continent, assigned to NATO. 
Why should it be America which, having monopolized the means of nuclear defense, 
also appropriates all direction in the common interest? The only serious proposal of 
recent date, the multilateral force, was an American concept. 
Suggestions for a European Nuclear Force have been voiced over a prolonged 
period, with no conclusive results. 
Would such a contingent be redundant, too costly, or politically unwise? 
Does the existing American formula, to employ nuclear weapons at some stage 
in case of war on the continent, legitimately answer European security needs, now and 
in the future? 
These are questions not only for the United States, but equally for the other 
NATO membe·rs, whose territorial integrity may be primarily at stake. 
Hence, NATO must serve as the format through which Europe, prosperous and 
increasingly self-assertive, becomes once again a determinant of its own destiny. 
Instead of perpetuating and accentuating the disparity between allies, the Organization 
must function as an honest broker of genuinely European concepts and proposals. To 
share determination over the ultimate questions of defense and therefore survival, 
Europe must be provided with the wherewithal to contribute to strategy, which is a 
vital first step in re-distributing responsibility within the Alliance. 
Agreement on this point presupposes that NATO's problens cannot be solved 
only through mechanical tinkering: the 1963 appointment of allied Observers to SAC at 
Omaha, assignment of an allied ~clear deputy to SACEUR that same year, a co-~~a\ -~~~ 
over the firing of IRBM's for the European state accepting such a contingent on its soil, 
etc. In essence these measures, while useful in themselves, leave undisturbed the 
accomplished American might and strategy and do not go to the heart of the more basic 
problem we have been discussing. 
In further redressing the imbalance, we recornnend that the NATO Council, or 
any other agreed-to grouping, be utilized on a continuing basis and at short notice for 
diplomatic consultation among the allies. This forum should emerge as the principal 
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instrument for allied political decisioning, to resolve Alliance problems, determine 
strategy as recommended by the proposed strategy council, consult on crises erupting 
within or outside NATO territory, harmonize policy on matters of mutual concern, such as 
East-West relations, and exchange and review intelligence on a daily basis. This is a 
large order of business. Whether or not these newly-envisaged responsibilities for the 
Council would succeed in revitalizing NATO is dependent mainly on the attitude of the 
United States, the only member which can conceivably match power and will with its global 
interests. 
This suggestion probably means that clashes will occur and differences of 
opinion will become more obvious. It means that we must be prepared to consider the 
advice of allies on matters which perhaps ~ffect us more than them. Hitherto, our un-
willingness to use fully Alliance channels has been due, in part, to our apprehension 
about splitting the Alliance and implanting the impression of discord. 
It is in the swell of this proposition that Alliances soon lose their self-
generating, assumptive importance to the membership. What the Organization discusses, 
communally, becomes steadily less momentous; the communiques become more and more 
repetitious and meaningless. As the Alliance (i.e. allegiance to the common cause) 
loses its hold, the lowest common denominator gets more elusive and banal. Here 
exhaustive efforts are expended to shore up a united front for public consumption, but 
the gap between pretense and substantive accomplishment becomes greater. 
This is a prescription for the decay of international organization. A major 
cause is the inability of nembers to confront and resolve differing interests, shading 
the discord with platitudes and artificial fence-mending. Soon, in this case, the 
alliance may become a liability by frustrating the new and legitimate demands of its 
members; by intensifying disagreements through would-be, pseudo solutions; by posing a 
paper deterrent to aggression whose intent and promise becomes more and more ambiguous 
and therefore dangerous to peace and stability. 
To be sure, an honest endeavor to utilize Alliance organs fully, to make NATO 
a relevant instrument for accommodation and decision, carries its own risks. The greater 
gamble, however, is to allow NATO a steadily diminishing influence. 
We suggest that this newly-refurbished political arm attempt to reach positive 
agreements on the broad questions of East-West trade (supplementing COCOM) and relations 
with Eastern Europe generally, on present and future disarmament moves, on the reunifica-
tion of Germany, on aid to the undeveloped countries, worldwide security problems and other 
important matters. For instance, it could take the lead in evolving a 
combined and coordinated approach to assist the poor nations, through a Western aid con-
sortium which harnesses our mutual abundance, technology, and trading power for the bene-
fit of the emerging states. 
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There are other pertinent recommendations that flow from the two proposals made above, 
which are not novel by any means. In fact, the Republican Fact-Finding Hission to NATO 
in 1965, composed of members of this Committee, recommended the establishment of a NATO 
Diplomatic Standing Group as a political organ. 
The proposed group should also be equipped to bring allied thinking to bear 
on crises lmich erupt anY'-1here in the uorld, as a sort of ·'crisis management'' vehicle. 
As Europe is brought more and more into the resolution of common strategy, a 
closer military harmonization should emerge with respect to national defense policies and 
budgets. 
Long-term agreements should be negotiated, among all the allies, to establish 
a cost-sharing formula for the stationing of troops abroad in the common defense. 
Targets, quotas, and force levels which are presently and patently ignored 
should be revised through Alliance negotiation in response to conceived security needs 
and domestic concerns. 
This Committee has already recommended that the North Atlantic Assembly, composed 
of elected representatives of the member-states liDo debate .. and exchange ideas on Atlantic 
.11ffairs, be given official status as a part of the HATO organization. The Assembly exists 
today as an unofficial body and until this year was known as the NATO Parliamentarians 
Conference.* 
Consideration should be given to a more equitable distribution of NATO command 
positions, including the appointment of a European officer as SACEUR and a revision of 
existing practice under which SACEUR is, for all intents and purposes, assigned and dis-
charged by the U.S. President. A full exchange and revieu of intelligence material should 
be carried forth on a continuous basis. 
As our oYn re-examination of NATO policy proceeds, in conjunction with that 
of our allies, and as the Europeans emerge from their abdicated strategic role, a 
clarification of our nuclear course of action must, of course, flow automatically. 
We have deliberately avoided a stress on so-called "hardware" solutions to 
the NATO crisis. The problem of nuclear-sharing has been pictured, on too many occasions, 
as a purely or predominently tangible grant of nuclear control to our allies, who pre-
sumably desire a finger on the trigger, contending that this is the sole answer to their 
insecurity and impotence. t~ile this claim is revealing and holds sway among segments of 
European opinion, it does not fully represent the true situation. To the extent that 
Europeans desire to acquire nuclear weapons on their o~m or gain some authority over the 
U. S. deterrent, this is symptomatic of deeper frustrations which cannot simply be 
assuaged by a negligible national deterrent or some mechanical formula to communally un-
leash U. S. power on the continent. Many Europeans, in fact, who speak harshly about the. 
U. S. hegemony, would rather leave the crucial decisions up to tvashington. 
*Statement of House Republican Committee on llestern Alliances, June 11, 1967~ 
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Misgivings about American strategic doctrine and doubts about the American 
guarantee have been far more persuasive factors in convincing Europeans that a 
"hardware" solution may be necessary. In attempting to judge opinion and government 
policy abroad, at this stage, we must not rule out the possibility that a dissemination 
of nuclear weapons may become superfluous when these misgivings and doubts are properly 
answered or when, as we have set forth, the Alliance operates properly. Our recommen-
dation to develop a genuine Europe function in the determination of Atlantic defense 
strategy is certainly urgent in redressing the European sense of weakness and removing 
uncertainties. Furthermore, we believe that our European allies should share the 
initiative in jointly resolving the question of a European nuclear role in NATO which, 
demonstrably, must evolve from the thorough and basic re-evaluation of Alliance affairs 
we advised earlier. The MLF concept went some distance toward granting Europeans real 
control over a nuclear contingent; this was a wholly American scheme which was never 
enthusiastically embraced by our allies. The failure of this plan, and the danger of 
oversimplifying European sentiment and motives, should warn us against manufacturing 
artful and hasty replies to the serious problems besetting the Alliance. 
As we suggested above, moreover, American cooperation toward the erection of 
an essentially-European-owned nuclear deterrent, linked in some manner to NATO, should 
come only after official opinion abroad has coalesced. One of ML.F's serious short-
comings was th.:::.t !t o:..·~Q puohQd up-on the NATO. co~ntries before they had sufficiently 
thought through its consequences and the whole question of nuclear participation; from 
country to country opinion varied and kept shifting. If stampeded into fruition, MLF 
might have served to divide the NATO membership, by enlisting only a minority of 
parties which would have monopolized control within an Alliance of proverbial equals. 
Furthermore, one cannot dismiss the possibility that England and France, the 
other NATO nuclear states, may in the future decide to cooperate in this field, either 
informally or through joint management. While this prospect appears. remote at this 
stage, any discussion about a NATO nuclear force must make reference to the already 
existing national capabilities. 
The essential point is that the European NATO states should be encouraged to 
formulate a unified position on the question of obtaining a European nuclear force to 
which the United States, presumably, would render support and assistance. It would be 
a serious mistake for the American government to foist new and costly joint-management 
schemes upon the Europeans unless opinion abroad solidifies. However, a nuclear non-
proliferation treaty should not foreclose a European option to develop, on the basis of 
existing national capabilities, a European deterrent force which is responsive to their 
conceived interests. This, of course, relates to our earlier discussion concerning an 
intensive, inter-allied review of NATO objectives and an enlarged role for Europe in 
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strategy determination. 
We are convinced that, while the urgency of the military threat from Moscow 
may have receded, a closely alligned program for defense of the Atlantic area remains 
essential. We reject the notion that developing political interests, and changing 
patt.erns of-thought~- are inevitably antithetical to the maintenance of sound military 
preparedness. But unless the Alliance can adjust to these shifting currents, and serve 
to channel and coordinate the new energies and interests of its members, its influence 
will ~lowly erode • 
. ·-·· . - .. 
The Soviet effort today is geared to loosening French ties to NATO, to 
nourishing areas of allied discord, and ultimately to neutralizing the military potency 
of the Alliance, as members tend to go their separate ways. This would be a tragedy, not 
only for our mutual security, but indeed for Western civilization. 
As we have stated previously, NATO is both part and consequence of allied 
diplomacy; we cannot build a wall around it and render it immune from changing objectives 
and perspectives. 
In failing to grasp the significance of contemporary pressures and events, in 
allowing NATO to flounder and grow steadily less vital to the member-states, the United 
States risks playing directly into the hands of Moscow and its long-range strategy of 
disabling the Atlantic Alliance. 
NATO is constantly buffeted by often unexpected and seemingly extraneous 
developments. 
Three recent and unrelated events, which need not be spelled out in detail, 
reflect the changing political context: 
(1) the decision of the West German cabinet, reached independently, 
to trim military spending by $2.2 billion through 1971, which might 
reduce the size of the Bundeswehr by 40,000 to 60,000 men; 
(2) the statement of Premier Maurer of Rumania, on a visit to the Netherlands, 
urging that NATO and the Warsaw Pact be dismantled and that every country 
"should be master of his own house." 
(3) the British White Paper on defense, which calls for a 20% reduction in 
military manpower by the mid-70's, and the withdrawal from Singapore 
and Malaysia. 
We do not infer that these isolated actions will destroy NATO. But they do 
portray, however inadequately, the fluid character of politics on the continent and the 
emergence of new preoccupations. The real challenge in preserving NATO is 
to reclaim for it a positive role in shaping political decisioning among the allies, 
including questions of nuclear strategy. 
• 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
" 
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We are convinced that the problems of NATO are the outgrowth of a lack of 
political will. With the comprehensive re-assessment proposed in this statement, 
together with institutional changes geared to updating Europe's role in Alliance affairs, 
NATO can regain an essential relevance in dealing with the needs and interests of its 
membership. We are equally convinced that nothing short of the recommendations 
contained herein can solve the NATO crisis, which has been allowed to fester interminably, 
with the governments all but blind to the alarming evidence of decay that no amount of 
official posturing can hide • 
---- -------
